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I. Introduction 
During he previous two decades, the United 
States pol :y in Asia has been based on an 
extension >f the containment strategy originally 
designed f >r Europe. It started with the as-
sumption hat Chinese Communism constituted 
the same kind of expansionist threat to the 
security o the noncommunist world, and ulti-
mately to the United States, as did communism 
in its Rm ;ian variant. 
In July 1969, Mr. Nixon made the "Guam De-
claration" stating in effect that, although U.S. 
treaty cor mitments remained in force and the 
U.S. nuc ear umbrella would continue to 
be exten led to protect allies, the "Nixon 
Doctrine" called for gradual American retrench-
IV. Conclusion 
V. Summary 
1. The North Korean Reaction 
2. The South Korean Reaction 
ment and greater "burden sharing" on the 
part of allies throughout the world. 
In J 971, the first withdrawal of U.S. military 
troops from the Korean peninsula was made. 
The collapse of the U.S. effort in Southeast 
Asia in 1975 and the announcement by the 
Carter Administration early in 1977 that U.S. 
ground combat forces would be withdrawn 
from the Korean peninsula over the course of 
the next several years further reduced confi-
dence in American power and in America's 
reliability as an ally of Japan on the part of 
certain members of Japan's governing elite. n; 
The Korean peninsula has long been recog-
nized as the focal point for conflicting interests 
among the great powers in Northeast Asia. It 
was the American response to Kim 11-sung's 
invasion of South Korea in June of 1950 which 
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brought th€ United Stated into direct confron-
tation with communist ambitions in the region; 
ever since, it has been the presence of the 
American t oops on the peninsula which has, 
in the mi1 ds of almost all observers both 
American a 1d Asian, constituted the key sta-
bilizing for e in the complex politics of the 
region. Th€ early 1977 announcement by the 
Carter Adrr inistration that the U.S. intended to 
withdraw rr ost of its ground forces from Korea 
over the ne ~t four to five years stirred anxiety 
throughout ~ortheast Asia. 
II. The North Korean Reaction 
Accordin€ 
January 3, 
to a Pyongyang broadcast, on 
1978, the withdrawal of foreign 
troops from the Korean peninsula is a pre-con-
dition for tchieving the reunification of the 
country. <21 ''his suggests that a main principle 
of North K rea's foreign policy is to emphasize 
the withdr twa! of foreign troops from the 
Korean pen nsula. 
The RodG 1g Shinmun(North Korean Worker's 
Party newsr 1per) of January 15, 1978, said that 
the U.S. ha I brought in new types of air force 
equipment t• South Korea and that the establish-
ment of thE Korea-U.S. Joint Command served 
to increase ension in the area. It further said 
the withdr: wal of American forces was a 
disguise or smokescreen tactic in the streng-
thehing of their position on the Korean penin-
sula.131 
The news from Washington of the possibility 
of an amendment of the troop withdrawal plan 
spurred further claims of trickery and obfus-
cation on the part of the Carter Administration 
from North Korea. w 
A Pyongyang Broadcast reported on Feb. L 
1978 that the Department of Foreign Affairs of 
North Korea had suddenly announced a memo-
randum deploring that the ROK, the U.S. and 
Japan, were making joint attempts to perpe-
tuate the division of the Korean peninsula, 
and also declaring that North Korea would 
never tolerate such attempts. The memorandum 
further stated that American troops, bases and 
nuclear weapons in South Korea should be 
withdrawn completely, 151 and stressed that the 
U.S. must phase out all its troops and military 
weapons of "slaughter", especially nuclear wea-
pons, from South Korea completely and without 
delay, 161 and that it at the same time stop 
intervention in Korean affairs. 181 
The Pyongyang authorities also held that 
their demands corresponded with the interests 
of the Korean and world peoples. Moreover, 
they alleged that debate in South Korea 
regarding the withdrawal of American troops 
had the intended result of firming their exis-
(2) The Naewoe Press (News article series), No. 731, January 3, 1978, p. 5 
(3) Kan1 Chul Soo's commentary, The Rodong Shinmun, February 3, 1978, p. 5. 
Kan1 Chul Soo's commentary, The Rodong Shinmun, February 3, 1978, p. 6. 
Shin Tong Bum's commentary, The Rodong Shinmun, February 9, 1978, p. 6. 
The Naewoe Press (News article series), No. 740, January 16, 1978. 
The Naewoe Press (News article series), No. 768, February 17, 1980. 
The Naewoe Press (News article series), No. 773, February 28, 1978. 
The Naewoe Press (News article series), No. 780, March 4, 1978. 
The 'ifaewoe Press (News article series), No. 781, March 6, 1978. 
(4) The Naewoe Press (News article series), No. 825, April 27, 1980. 
(5) Pyon (yang Broadcasting, February l, in The Naewoe Press (Naewoe article series), No. 
755, February 2, 1978. 
(6) The Naewoe Press (Supplement VII), 1979, p. 78. 
Nort. Korea Quart<?rly, VoL V, No. 1, 1978, p. 43. 
(7) The N'aewoe Press (News article series), No. 760, February 8, 1978, p. 78. 
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tence ther• . 
North K >rea continued to carry statements 
published •Y various civilian organizations in 
the Rodot s Shinmun which were basically 
favorable 1 J its official position, and this effort 
was aimed at affirming to the Korean people 
that their >osition was qllite righteous. 18' 
North K •rea showed a very sensitive reaction 
to the mil tary exercise called "Team Spirit 
'78," and 1enounced the fact that "such an 
exercise h8 1 the purpose of heightening tension 
in the Kor an peninsula and was a part of 
America's !ouble·faced tactic to perpetuate the 
division of Korea by force. 191 
Concerni .g the testimony of U.S. Defense 
Secretary l arold Brown to the House of Repre-
sentatives, he Pyongyang authorities denounced 
it as "a rec dess act" and as "having the purpose 
of making he Japanese territory available for 
new milita1 y bases to invade North Korea." 1111 
It alleged hat "Team Spirit '78 was a mere 
reckless act which increased the danger of war, 
and assertec that all means of war in South 
Korea, including American troops and nuclear 
weapons, must be removed completely." l12l On 
March 6, North Korea's Department of Foreign 
Affairs made a statement through Pyongyang 
Central Broadcasting in 'which it seriously 
attacked the joint ROK-American military 
exercise Team Spirit '78, 1131 and this denun· 
ciation was also publicized through a statement 
made by a spokesman of the Revolutionary 
Party of Unification. 114J In addition, North 
Korea heightened its attacks on such military 
exercises by carrying many statements made 
by various oversea organizations in its official 
organ, the Rodong Shinmun. 115> 
This organ also carried statements seriously 
attacking such military exercises in the name 
of social organizations in North Korea. North 
Korea showed a sensitive reaction to the visit 
of Rogers, the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, to 
South Korea, and reiterated its previous-claim 
by stating that his visit was aimed at reinfor-
cing the preparedness for another war on the 
Korean peninsula according to a "plan of 
(8) The Soviet newspapers and news agencies review the plan for U.S. troop withdrawals from 
Kon a, The Rodong Shinmun, January 13, 1978, p. 6; The Revolutionary Party of Unification's 
spok !Sman makes a statement. The Rodong Shinmun, January 26, 1979, p. 5; The 
Rodc ng Shinmun, January 27, 1978, p. 6. says the statement about U.S. troop withdrawals 
frorr Korea was a deceptive claim aimed to justify South Korea's armament; All military 
prov >Cations in South Korea should be ceased according to Bulgarian newspapers and 
Alb< 1ian correspondences, The Rodong Shinmun, January 31, p. 6; The Rodong S!linmun, 
Febr 1ary l, 1978 reports the argument in the International Democratic Lawyers Association 
Conf !fence that U.S. should withdraw from South Korea promptly and cease its support for 
the ! outh Korean regime. 
(9) Kan1 Chul Sao's commentary entitled "A Trial to Keep two Koreas by Force", The Rodong 
Shin: tun, February 6, 1978, p. 6. 
(10) The Rodong Shinmun, February 22, 1978, The Naewoe Press (Supplement VIII), op. cit, 
p.16: ; The Rodong Shinmun, February 26, 1978, p. 6. 
(11) Song Moo Kyong's commentary, The Rodong Shinmun, March l, 1978, p. 3, p. 6. 
Song Moo Kyong's commentary, The Rodong Shinmun, March 2, 1978, p. 6. 
The Rodong Shinmun, March 3, 1978, p. 4, p. 3; The Rodong Shinmun, March 4, 1978, 
p. 5, p. 6. 
(12) The 
(13) The 
(14) The 
(15) The 
Rodong Shinmun, 
Rodong Shiunmn, 
Rodong Shinmun, 
Rodong Shinmun, 
March 5, 
March 6, 
March 6, 
March 7, 
1978, p. 5. 
1978, p.5. 
1978, p. 4. 
1978, p. 4, p. 5. 
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invasion int J North Kon,a." 061 According to 
North Korea s arguments, the U.S. commitment 
to the defen e of South Korea and the U.S. 
president's : olicy of phasing out American 
ground force : from South Korea have actually 
resulted in t 1e reinforcement of South Korea's 
military po ¥er, and the precipitation of 
America's 1 reparation for an invasion into 
North Korea !171 The North Korean authorities 
denounced tl e "occupation" of South Korea by 
the America . imperialists and their policy of 
invasion as aajor elements causing the nation's 
misery, and Jf increasing the possibility of war 
at all times. They claimed the U.S. presence 
and influenc ~ made the Korean peninsula a 
powder keg 1 .tuation. !lSJ They went on that "the 
pullout of n ilitary forces from South Korea 
which was 1 nnounced by the American impe-
rialists mear t only a change in U.S. policy 
based on a : ower status quo and at the same 
time was m4 rely a way to cover up its new 
scheme to b ing about war in Korea". 119l 
After a si "nee on U.S. policy toward South 
Korea had hung for several weeks, Nonh 
Korea, on April 23, 1978, again started 
directing se' "re attacks on the Carter Administ-
ration for it: neglect in carrying out the initial 
plan of wit) drawing its ground forces from 
South Korea 
The Rode zg Shinmun claimed on April 23 
that the Ca ter administration's plan to with· 
draw Amer can ground forces from South 
Korea was < rrly a deceptive tactic, that despite 
its asserted plan of phasing out its ground 
(16) The '?.odong Shinmun, March 8, 1978, p. 5. 
forces, the U.S. continued to reinforce strength 
in South Korea, and the ROK military was 
also making every effort to strengthen itself. f201 
With regard to the communique issued by 
President Carter on April 21, in which he 
revealed a partial revision of the plan to with-
draw American military forces in South Korea, 
North Korea claimed on April 26 that such a 
revision made it clear that Carter's pledge had 
originally been made a as only a clever tactic 
to influence world opinion to perceive a 
renewed North Korean threat. f21l 
It is noteworthy that North Korea concen· 
trated on severe attacks on Team Spirit '78 
and on the Carter Administration, and that it 
proclaimed that it would again strengthen 
its anti-American position. 
Pyongyang Broadcasting reported that Kim 
11 -sung, the North Korean leader, had reite-
rated that he himself was resolutely opposed 
to the two·Koreas idea, and that the complete 
withdrawal of the American military force 
stationed in South Korea was the only righteous 
way to solve the Korean problem. rzzJ 
Hua Kuo·fung, Chinese Premier and Party 
Chairman made a state visit to North Korea 
on May 5, 1978, on Kim Il-sung's invitation. 
The Chinese leader had summit meetings with 
Kim 11 -sung three times, and participated 
in a series of mass welcome rallies held in 
the cities of Pyongyang and Hamheung. He 
returned to Peking after a 6-day visit. 
Through policy announcements made during 
his visit to North Korea, Hua emphasized that 
(17) The Rodong Shinmun, March 9, 1978, p. 6; ibid., March 10, 1978, p. G; ibid., March 11, 
p. 4; ibid., March 12, p. 6; ibid., March 13, p. 5; ibid., March 14, p. 5; ibid., March 15, 
ibid., March 16 p. 5, p. 6. 
(18) The Rodong Shinmun, March 28, 1978, p. l, p. 3. 
(19) The 'Vaewoe Press (Material series), No. 66, April 5, 1978. 
(20) The Rodong Shinmun, April 23, 1978, p. 6. 
(21) Kang Chul Soo's commentary, The Rodong Shinmun, April 26, 1978, p. 6. 
(22) The Vaewoe Press (Material series), No. 70, May 3, 1978. 
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the U.S. sur ?orted the "two Koreas" policy and 
perpetuated .heir division, and that it did not 
give up its mbitions of invading the socialist 
nations by t >ing Korea as a military base. He 
went on tha. the Korean peninsula was artifi· 
cially split i tto two parts, and that the major 
cause was f, und in compulsory American impe· 
rialistic occt pation of South Korea and thfir 
policy towar l the division of Korea. 1231 
In partic1 lar, Hua said as follows: "the 
American g< vernment must withdraw its inva· 
ding army f ·om South Korea, and then Korea 
must be reu 1ited. The two peoples of North 
Korea and l :hina will fight the enemy to the 
last and wi l have the final victory."'241 Most 
noteworthy here was that China generally 
recognized l !orth Korea as the only legal and 
sovereign sl tte in the Korean Peninsula and 
did not ext{ 1d her recognizance to South Korea. 
In this res •ect, China reaffirmed her strong 
diplomatic 1 upport for North Korea, strengthe· 
ning the 1 ttter's status in the international 
community. 
Kim Il-sJ ng, in an address welcoming Hua 
at a mas~ rally held in Pyongyang, said 
that "the L S. had broken its pledge to phase 
out Americ. n troops, and that it had further 
strengthene . preparations for war on an unpre· 
cedentedly large scale. He went on in the 
address tha the U.S. must stop its imprudent 
military bu ld·up and withdraw its troops from 
South Kore ' as pledged as soon as possible, 
and that tb ! U.S. together with North Korea 
should seek a peaceful solution to the Korean 
problem. 1251 
-------
(23) The Rodong Shinmun, May 8, 1978, p.2. 
(24) The Rodong Shinmun, May 7, 1978, p.3. 
(25) Tht Rodong Shinmun, May 8, 1978, p.2. 
(26) Tht Rodong Shinmun, May 12, 1978, p.6. 
(27) Tht Rodong Shinmun, May 14, 1978, p. 6. 
(28) Tht Rodong Shinmun, May 14, 1978, p.14. 
(29) Tht Rodong Shinmun, May 16, 1978, p. 3. 
North Korea, at the 386th truce talks, claimed 
that "the American imperialists must stop all 
provocative actions leading to war and imme· 
diately leave Korea, withdrawing its invading 
armed forces from South Korea." 1261 
The Rodong Shinmun carried an editorial on 
May 14 written by Hang Jin·suk, denouncing 
the U.S. plan to withdraw its armed force as 
"a mere maneuver to build up its military 
power,"'271 and also quoted a report by the 
North Korean Central News Agency entitled 
"the disclosure and censure of a new provoca· 
tive scheme of war by American imperialism 
and South Korea," in which it was said 
that various overseas social organizations and 
newspapers had asked America to leave South 
Korea. 1281 A delegation of the Japanese Socialist 
Party, headed by ltzio Askada, visited Pyong· 
yang at the invitation of North Korea from 
May ll to 16. During its stay in North Korea, 
the delegation had a series of meetings with 
the North Korean authorities. 
Park Sung·chul, in his address welcoming 
the delegation, argued that the American im· 
perialists and the South Korean authorities 
were making every effort to prepare for war 
by extensively reinforcing their invading mili· 
tary force and by frequently conducting mili· 
tary exercises, while reserving the deceptive 
plan of the withdrawal of military ground 
forces. 1291 Responding to this statement, ltzio 
Askada stressed that the U.S. should withdraw 
all deadly weapons, including nuclear weapons, 
from South Korea, unconditionally and com· 
pletely. 1301 
(30) Tht Rodong Shinmun, May 14, 1978; ibid., May 16, 1978, p. 3. 
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Askada v .sited Panmunjom, and asserted that 
it was natt; :a! that American troops be with· 
drawn since the Armistice Agreement stipulates 
that all for ign troops must do so, and held 
that there " as no reason for them to be stationed 
in South I' orea. He went on that "a peace 
treaty must be concluded between North Korea 
and the U S. since only those two countries 
had signed .he Armistice Agreement." '311 
On may ~ 3, 1978, Nicolae Ceauseascu, the 
Rumanian P ·esident, left North Korea for Hanoi 
after finishi 1g a 4-day visit to Pyongyang. A 
joint commt nique between Kim Il-sung and 
Ceauseascu vas announced, in which the two 
leaders insis .ed on the complete withdraw! of 
American t ·oops in . South Korea and also 
denounced :he South Korean government's 
attempt to J erpetuate the division of Korea by 
adhering to 1 two Koreas policy. '32 l 
On May 9, 1978, President J. Opango of 
Congo left >yongyang after ending a 5-day 
visit. A i< int communique was announced 
during his s ay in Pyongyang, asserting that 
"all foreign :roops stationed in South Korea and 
all the mean: of war, including nuclear weapons, 
must be cor cpletely withdrawn."<33l On June 
24, 1978, th ' Rodong Shinmun released a state· 
ment entitle< "we appeal for a massive inter· 
national cam. •aign as a means to force all foreign 
troops to be withdrawn." In this statement, the 
official orga1 of North Korea emphasized that 
"American i11perialism should stop its reckless 
maneuvers t > provoke war and leave South 
Korea without delay.<3<l 
On the same day, a mass rally held in Pyong· 
yang declared that the American imperialists 
must give up their ambition of invading North 
Korea, throw away their scheme for a new 
war, and leave South Korea without delay."<:JOl 
Also, the Rodong Shinmun editorial of the same 
day carried such catchphrases as "American 
imperialists··immediately leave South Korea," <36l 
and "American imperialists··wash your hands of 
Korea." 1371 
North Korea, through the Rodong Shinmun, 
insisted that the U.S. stop its reckless playing 
with fire and immediately evacuate its all troops 
and deadly weapons from South Korea according 
to the U.N. Resolution and as pledged previ· 
ously. On the same day, it also loudly claimed 
that the American imperialistic aggressors 
should leave South Korea. 
North Korea set a thirty day period, fifteen 
days before June 25 and fifteen days afterward, 
as the period for a joint anti-American struggle, 
emphasizing that "American troopsmust leave 
South Korea immediatetely." 14°1 In an editorial 
on June 29, the Rodong Shinmun stated that 
the U.S. should withdraw its troops and all 
deadly weapons immediately and completely. "<m 
On the day commemorating the announcement 
of the July 4th Joint South·North Communique, 
the North Korean authorities publicized a state· 
ment entitled "The Three Major Principles 
Essential for National Unification." In this 
(31) The . >laewoe Press (Material series), No. 73, May 24, 1978. 
(32) The . ~odong Shinmun, May 22, 1978, p. 2, p. 3, p. 4, p. 6. 
(33) The . vaewoe Press (Material series), No. 75, June 7, 1978. 
(34) The - ~odong Shinmun, June 24, 1978, p. 2. 
(35) The - ~odong Shinmun, June 26, 1978, p. 1. 
(36) Ibid., p. 4. 
(37) Ibid., p. 6. 
(38) The '~odong Shinmun, June 27, 1978, p. 3. 
(39) Ibid., p. 5. 
(40) The i :odong Shinmun, June 28, 1978, p. 6. 
(41) The i :odong Shinmun, June 29, 1978, p. 4. 
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statement they stressed that "the American 
imperialh :s are backing up the Park military 
clique an l perpetuating the division of Korea 
by reinfo cing their naval and air forces behind 
the plan ,f the withdrawal of troops and also 
by stockp ling ammunition and other military 
manpowe and facilities from South Korea." 142 > 
North I ~orea also announced on July 8 a 
communi< ue in the name of what is called the 
Central C Jmmittee of the Revolutionary Party 
of Unific; tion, in which it asserted that "the 
American imperialistic aggressors, who at· 
tempt to ·einforce military power and to project 
provocati• e actions behind the plan of the 
withdraw .l of military ground forces, must be 
removed.' 143> 
Also, tJ e Rodong Shinmun carried an editorial 
on July 1 ., entitled "the commitment to the 
withdraw .l of military forces and the perpetual 
compulsor r occupation of South Korea," in 
which it vas reiterated that "the U.S. should 
leave Sou h Korea as soon as possible.''<44 > 
On Jul) 12 the Rodong Shinmun carried a 
comment ;tating that "it. is a strong tide of the 
times to < emand that the U.S. stop :its plot to 
reinforce ailitary might behind the withdrawal 
plan and hat it pull out its troops from South 
Korea, an I support our people's 'great work to 
achieve n .tiona! unification." 145> 
The Ro long Shinmun also declared that the 
U.S. was preparing a "fanatic tactic for a new 
war behind the plan of the troops' withdrawal", 
on July 13, 146> 
The Secretariat of the Committee for Peaceful 
National Unification also announced on July 13 
that "the American imperialists must stop their 
reckless plot for a new war, which is being 
prepared behind the plan of the withdrawal of 
ground forces, and they must also sincerely 
remove their invading troops and all military 
facilities from South Korea." 147> Every day for 
a week, the Rodong Shinmun featured overseas 
comments made on the withdrawal of American 
troops. 148> 
Subsequently, the Rodong Shinmun carried an 
editorial on July 24 entitled "the American 
imperialists' plot to bring the puppet armed 
forces of South Korea into an adventure of war," 
stating that "the U.S. should remove all its 
troops and nuclear weapons from South Korea 
without delay.'' 149> 
In an editorial four days later on the theme 
"our people are resolutely determined to hamper 
and ruin the American imperialists' plot to 
divide Korea and provoke war, and then to 
achieve national unification," the Rodong Shin· 
mun said that "there is no reason why U.S. 
military forces should stay in South Korea,"i50l 
while asserting that the U.S. was "forced to 
publicize its plan of the withdrawal of military 
(42) T e Rodong Shinmun, July 4, 1978, p. 4, p. 5, p. 6. 
(43) Tl e Revolutionary Party of Unification Central Committee announcement, The Rodong 
Sh 'nmun, July 9, 1978, p. 4, p. 5, p. 6. 
(44) So 1g Moo Kyong's commentary, The Rodong Shinmun, July 11, 1978, p. 5. 
(45) Cl o Nam Soo's commentary, The Rodong Shinmun, July 12, 1978, p. 5. 
(46) !b. i.; Kim Chong Kyu's commentary, The Rodong Shinmun, July 13, 1978, p. 6. 
(47) T 'e Rodong Shinmun, July 14, 1978, p. 5. 
P) )ngyang authorities announced it on July 13, 1978. 
(48) T 'e Rodong Shinm!ln, July 15, 1978; ibid., July 16, 1978; ibid., July 17, 1978; ibid., July 
18 1978; ibid., .July 20, 1978; ibid., July 21, 1978; ibid., July 22, 1978; ibid., July 25, 
1971; ibid., July :~6. 1978; ibid., July 27, 1978. 
(49) W 1ang Chin Sik's commentary, The Rodong Shinmun, July 24, 1978, p. 5. 
(50) T 'e Rodong Shinmun, July 27, 1978, p. 1. 
(51) Sc 1g Moo Kyong's commentary, ibid., p. 5. 
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forces from & ~th Korea with invading military 
facilities and tew style weapons, and by con-
ducting milita ·y exercises frequently."< 511 Fur· 
thermore, the organ mentioned specially a catch-
phrase which translates: "American aggressors: 
leave South I\ Jrea immediately."I5ZI 
Ho Tam, V ce Premier and Foreign Minister 
of North Kon I, delivered an address at the 
meeting in Ju y of the non-aligned nation, in 
which he said "In order to find a peaceful 
solution to t: e Korean problem all American 
troops and nuc ear weapons must be withdrawn, 
foreign interv ntion into Korean affairs should 
be stopped, and the Armistice Agreement 
should be trat sformed into a peace treaty."l531 
Social organ zations and political parties in 
North Korea Itade an appea'l on July 30 decla-
ring that "t te American imperialists must 
withdraw the:: invading military troops and 
weapons and eave South Korea without delay 
in accordance with the Resolution of the 30th 
U.N. General Assembly."<541 
According t ' a report in the Rodong Shinmun, 
the participa1 ts in the non-aligned foreign 
minister's con erence rendered their support to 
North Korea'f position that all foreign troops 
stationed in S mth Korea should be withdrawn 
and the Armi tice Agreement should be made 
into a peace < ~reement. 1551 
Moreover, i 1 its editorial entitled "a historic 
conference on he preservation of autonomy and 
unity," the j ~odong Shinmun stated that all 
foreign troops and military bases in foreign 
(52) Ibid. 
territories must he completely removed, the 
headquarters of the U.N. military force be dis-
mantled, all foreign military bases and facilities 
in South Korea be abolished, and the Armistice 
Agreement be transformed into a peace agree-
ment." It went on that "the American impe-
rialists must withdraw all their deadly weapons, 
including their troops and nuclear weapons, 
without delay and completely." 1561 
The Rodong Shinmun also stated in an edito-
rial on August 5 that "in order to remove the 
cause of tension in Asia and to eliminate the 
danger of war American. military forces must 
be withdrawn from South Korea."157> 
The Central Committee of the Revolutionary 
Party of Unification in North Korea announced 
a declaration in August, in which it stressed 
that "we have to fight for the withdrawal of 
the American troops in South Korea," and that 
"the U.S. must pull out all its invading forces 
including its troops and nuclear weapons, im-
mediately and completely." 1581 
The Rodong Shinmun made a comment on 
August 11 on the theme of "reckless tactics of 
a fanatic of war," stating that "the U.S. should 
immediately leave South Korea and remove all 
American troops and nuclear weapons." 1591 
Kim Il-sung gave an address in which he 
emphasized that "the U.S. must abandon its 
ambition to maintain colonial rule over South 
Korea, and to finally take all Korea under its 
rule, and that it should withdraw its troops 
from South Korea as soon as possible and com-
pletely in accordance with the U.N. Resolution 
(53) The R 1dong Shinmun, July 28, 1978, p. 4; North Korea Quarterly, VoL V, No. 3&4, 1978, 
pp. 44- .o. 
(54) The R •dong Shinmun, July 30, 1978, p. 6. 
(55) The R •dong Shinmun, August l, 1978, p. L 
(56) The R 1dong Shinmun, August 3, 1978, p. 5. 
(57) Editori II, The Rodong Shinmun, August 5, 1978, p. 1. 
(58) The R 1dong Shinmun, August 7, 1978, p. 6; Editorial, The Rodong Shinmun, August 12, 
1978, '· 1; The Rodong Shinmun, August 16, 1978, p. 3. 
(59) Song ~ [oo Kyong's commentary, The Rodong Shinmun, August 17, 1978, p. 6. 
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and its pre' ious pledge." <601 
Teng Sh: o-ping, the Chinese Vice Premier, 
who visitec North Korea to attend ceremonies 
commemora .ing the 30th anniversary of the 
founding ol North Korea (DPRK), participated 
in a mass ally held in the city of Hamheung 
on Septem 1er 11, 1978. In the address he 
delivered a: that rally, Teng declared that "I 
heartily su 1ported the North Korean people's 
righteous c ;mands for the dismantling of the 
U.N. milit. ry command and the complete with-
drawal of invading American military troops 
and facilit: ;s from South Korea."<1311 
North K 1rea reiterated as follows: "the U.S. 
has no rea on nor any pretence as to why it 
should stat on invading forces in South Korea, 
and Ameri :an troops must leave South Korea 
without dE ay with the complete removal of 
their dead] f weapons." 16 21 
The Roc mg Shinmun also mentioned in par-
ticular cor muniques supporting North Korea's 
demand fo · the withdrawal of American troops, 
issued by :ocial organizations abroad during the 
period fro1 1 September to October. 
The spo ;esman of the Revolutionary Party 
of Unifica1 ion issued a communique on Novem· 
her 13, in which he stressed that "the U.S. 
should wi· fldraw all its killing weapons and 
munitions from South Korea without delay and 
complete!) " 1631 
Througl its editorial, the Rodong Shinmun 
on Decem 1er 2 stated that "despite its pledge 
to withdr. w military forces, the U.S. has 
strengthened its military power and hastened 
its preparations for war." 1641 Thereafter, the 
organ continued to mention specially reports 
calling for the withdrawal of American troops 
in South Korea by various overseas leftist 
organizations which had appeared in foreign 
newspapers. 
The Rodong Shinmun also reported on Decem· 
her 6 the Resolution adopted by a world con· 
ference for Korea's unification on its front 
page, in which it was stressed that "North 
Korea called for the removal of all military 
weapons in South Korea, including American 
troops and nuclear weapons, the dismantling of 
the U.N. military command, the conclusion of 
a peace agreement between North Korea and 
the U.S., and the suspension of South Korea's 
military buildup." 1651 
For the first time, 219 American ground 
troops stationed in the South were sent home 
on December 13, 1978. 1661 On January 23, 1978, 
the Central Committee of the Democratic Front 
for the National Unification in North Korea 
issued a communique, in which it stressed that 
"all military actions which are hostile and 
threatening should be stopped unconditionally 
and immediately, and that the introduction of 
military weapons into Korea be suspended and all 
possibility of military clashes be eliminated. "<671 
The Rodong Shinmun restated through its 
editorial that "these calls were a new realistic 
solution, reflecting the whole nation's aspira-
tions and will." 1661 
(60)-i(i n Il Sung's report celebrating the 30th year anniversary of Liberation from Japanese 
ru e, The Rodong Shinmun, September 10, 1978, p. 4. 
N, rth Korea Quarterly, Vol. V, No. 3&4, 1978, op. cit, p. 63. 
(61) T e Rodong Shinmun, September 12, 1978, p. 5. 
(62) K n Chang Woon's commentary, The Rodong Shinmun, September 17, 1978, p. 5. 
(63) T ~e Rodong Shinmun, November lei, 1978, p. 5. 
(64) T te Rodong Shinmun, December 2, 1978, p.l, p. 2, p. 3, p. 4, p. 6. 
(65) T te Rodong Shinmun, December 6, 1978, P. 1. 
(66) 7 ze Rodong Shinmun, December 13, 1978. 
(67) 7 te Rodong Shinmun, January 24, 1979, p. 1. 
(68) E itorial, ibid. 
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In a New Year's meeting with reporters, 
President Par ; Chung·hee of South Korea made 
an appeal to 'forth Korea that "a South·North 
dialogue unc •nditionally be reopened." 1691 In 
response to tl is proposal, the Secretariat of the 
Central Comr itte of the Democratic Front of 
National UniJ cation issued a communique on 
February 5, 17 1 and an editorial in the Rodong 
Shinmun des· ribed the proposal as "a new 
forward·looki: g proposal for dialogue and um· 
fication." 1711 ' 'hese words were carried in the 
Rodong Shinn un every day. 
On Februa1 f 23, 1979, the Rodong Shinmun 
carried a corr nent speaking ill of a joint ROK· 
U.S. military exercise. 1721 The spokesman of the 
Department o: the People's Army of North Korea 
issued a com1 mnique in which he argued that 
"the South K 1rean authorities, together with 
the U.S., sho 1ld be responsible for consequences 
that might re :ult from their reckless and hostile 
military actio LS threatening us." <731 
North Kore L heightened its propaganda drive 
against the j 1int ROK-D.S. military exercise. 
In a commen on March 16, 1979, "the Rodong 
Shinmun repo ted as follows: "the voice of the 
people of the world calling for the withdrawal 
of American nilitary forces becomes louder day 
by day. If th ! U.S. listens to this voice and 
withdraws ito military forces from South Korea 
without dela) it can detach itself from Korean 
affairs without losing face." 1151 
North Korea argued that "the stationing of 
American troops in South Korea was an .infringe· 
ment on human rights and a persistant threat 
to world peace." 176> 
In honor of the 29th anniversary of the 1950 
the Rodong Shinmun carried an editorial in 
which it reiterated that "the American imperial· 
ists must withdraw their invading military force 
from South Korea" 17Tl and that "it was neces· 
sary to wage a joint anti·American struggle as 
a means of hastening an effort to see the U.S. 
evacuate its troops from South Korea."17Sl 
North Korean Vice Premier Ho Tam made 
an address on June 27 stating that "for the 
purpose of national unification, the Armistice 
Agreement must be transformed into a peace 
agreement on the condition that foreign troops 
in South Korea would be withdrawn."179l More· 
over, North Korea announced a statement, in 
which it reiterated its previous position that 
"the American imperialists must withdraw 
their military means, including nuclear wea· 
pons, and immediately leave South Korea."<80> 
Concerning President Carter's June visit to 
South Korea, the North Korean authorities made 
a comment calling his trip "a tricky covered 
with a signboard for peace," 1811 in the Rodong 
Shinmun, in which they stated as follows: "It 
is not essentially different from the continuous 
(69) The 1'ankook 1lbo, J,anuary 20, 1979; The Dong·A Ilbo, January 19, 1979. 
(70) The J. 1dong Shinmun, February 6, 1979, p. 1. 
(71) Editor al, ibid., the articles expressing their support appear daily from February 7 to Feburary 13· 
(72) The 1 odong Shinmun, February 23, 1979, p. 5. 
(73) The 1 odong Shinmun, March l, 1979, p. 1. 
(74) The 1 odong Shinmun, March 15, 1979, p. 3, (with the name of Ronpyongwon). 
(75) The 1 odong Shinmun, March 16, 1979, p. 3, ibid., March 17; ibid., March 18; ibid., March 
19; ib d., March 21; ibid., March 22; and ibid., March 25, p. 4. 
(76) The 1 onong Shinmun, April l, 1979, p. 6. 
(77) The 1 odong Shinmun, June 25, 1979, p. 1. 
(78) Ibid, ). 2, p. 3, p. 6; The Rodong Shinmun, June 26, 1979, p. 3, p. 4, p. 5, p. 6 
(79) The 1 odong Shinmun, June 28, 1979, p. 4. 
(80) Ibid., ). 6. 
(81) The 1 odong Shinmun, July l, 1979, p. 5. 
The } odong Shinmun, July 3, 1979, p. 2. 
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compulsory occupation (Jf South Korea by 
American 1 :oops under the pretence of the so-
called mili· ary balance of power. This is a 
breach of faith to American voters and a 
mockery tc the peace-loving people of the world. 
It becomes apparent that from the beginning 
Carter has had no intention of pulling out 
American · roops from South Korea." 
On the 8ccasion of the month of joint anti-
American ;truggle, North Korea stressed that 
American t ·oops must immediately be withdrawn 
under the :logan "We call for the withdrawal 
of Americ< n troops from South Korea." 182> 
The Rot ong Shinmun carried overseas reports 
critical of :::arter's visit to South Korea. <83> On 
July 10, 1: 79, the spokesman of North Korea's 
Departmen; of Foreign Affairs issued a com-
munique, in which he stated as follows: 
"Concerni1 g the switching of the Armistice 
Agreemen into a peace agreement, South 
Korea sho tid not participate in the negotiations 
which mi1 ht take place between North Korea 
and the l .S .. The reason is that South Korea 
is not qua ified to take part in the negotiations 
because it was not originally a signatory of the 
Armistice Agreement. If the U.S. really desires 
it, South Korea may be admitted only as an 
observer .nto the process of the negotiations 
between l !orth Korea and the U.S., the major 
subjects c: which would include the withdrawal 
of Ameri• an troops from South Korea and the 
transform ttion of the Armistice Agreement into 
a peace ~ 5reement." 184> In a comment entitled 
"Strippin1 off the Mask of Peace," 185 > the North 
(82) 1 ~e Rodong Shinmun, July 5, 1979, p. 6. 
Korean authorities denounced the Carter Admi-
nistration for continuing to strengthen military 
facilities and bases in South Korea under the 
pretense of so-called complementary steps 
necessary following the withdrawal of American 
troops, and for making every effort to prepare 
for another war, having totally given up its 
plan of the troops' withdrawal. 
In an· interview with the press in Peking on 
July 12, the North Korean Ambassador to China 
pointed out that U.S. President Carter's visit to 
South Korea and his proposal of a three-party 
conference was a reflection of the American 
ruling circles' ambition to perpetuate the 
division of Korea and to make South Korea 
their permanent colony and military base. 18~> 
Five days later North Korea also described 
the Japanese Self-Defense Minister's visit to 
South Korea as "a dangerous conspiracy for 
invasion and selling his country." 187> 
At a joint meeting between the members of 
the Central Committee and the Political 
Committee of the Workers' Party, and those 
of the Central People's Committee on July 18, 
North Korea adopted a Resolution declaring 
that "all foreign military bases and troops must 
be withdrawn. The target of this resolution 
was the would-be confluence of the non-aligned 
countries." 188> 
In an editorial, the Rodong Shinmun asserted 
as follows: "The American imperialists must 
remove themselves from South Korea without 
dalay. <89> The proposal of a three-party confe-
rence was a mere tactic to hide their 
(83) Il :d., p. 5; . Asian Security 1979, Research Institute for Peace and Security, Japan, 1979, 
p.l39. 
(84) 1/te Rodong Shinmun, July 11, 1979, p. 1. 
(85) Ii id., p. 4. 
(86) '1 he Rodong Shinmun, July 13, 1979, p. 5. 
(87) '1 he Rodong Shinmun, July 17, 1979, p. 6. 
(88) 'j he Rodong Shi'nmun, July 19, 1979, p. 1. 
(89) 'j he Rodong Shi'nmun, July 27, 1979, p.l, p. 5, p. 6. 
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actions to di ~ide Korea and to provoke war, 
and to decei re the public. •· At the 394th truce 
talks, the N 1rth Korean side claimed that "the 
U.S. must s spend immediately its criminal acts 
of the illega introduction of new style military 
weapons anc facilites for operations into South 
Korea, the c mduct of war exercises, and the 
using of St uth Korea as military base." 1901 It 
went on tha. "the U.S. must withdraw all its 
new style · reapons, faciliities for operations, 
and its inv tding troops from South Korea 
without deJa r and unconditionally, and should 
fulfill its du ies as stipulated in Clause 60 of 
the Armistic ! Agreement and be devoted to the 
Resolution o · the 30th U.N. General Assembly." 
(9!1 
A North l .orean press comment pointed out 
that "the ca apaign against the U.S. tactic to 
perpetuate tl e division of Korea must be further 
strengthened', and added that "the withdrawal 
of American troops from South Korea is an 
urgent requi ement of the times."I92J 
In an edit ·rial, the Rodong Shinmun empha· 
sized on Au1 . 15 as follows; "The American 
imperialists I ave cancelled their false plan of 
troop withdr .wal,. and provided South Korea 
with a nucle tr umbrella. They have also made 
a proposal fo · a three·party conference, but the 
problem of l .area's national unification muf.t 
be solved by Koreans themselves." 19:1l 
In a comm !nt five days later entitled "A 
Dangerous M litary Conspiracy". North Korea 
stated that 'the U.S. suspended its plan of 
troop withdn wal, further strengthened its mili· 
tary power i 1 South Korea, provided South 
Korea with a large amount of miltary assis· 
tance, instigated Japan to build up military 
links with Korea, and planned to form a trian-
gular military alliance with Japan and South 
Korea." 19'11 
At a commemorative meeting Aug. 21 of the 
lOth anniversary of the founding of the so·called 
Revolutionary Party of Unification held in 
Pyongyang, Kim Won, the Secretary of the 
Central Committee of the Workers' Party, 
spoke as follows: "American imperialism, with 
Carter's visit to South Korea, suspended its 
plan of the invading troops' withdrawal, attemp· 
ted to use the port of Jinhae as a naval base 
for their 7th Fleet, established a task force on 
the mainland of America under the pretence of 
coping with a state of emergency, and even 
made a plan to set up the Third Aircraft Car· 
rier Group which is expected to operate around 
South Korea and Japan. Thus, we turn down 
the proposal of a three·party conference as a 
segregator's idea. 1951 North Korea displayed a 
slogan on August 26 stating: "We energetically 
fight for the strengthening and development of 
the non-aligned movement under the flag of 
autonomy, unification and unity." Under this 
slogan, the North Korean authorities warned: 
"What the Carter Administration has done undE"r 
the pretense of the troops' withdrawal is only 
to build up its military strength and prepare 
military operations in South Korea. The U.S. 
established the joint ROK·U.S. military com· 
mand and a task force which prepared to move 
South Korea, and already has a short·term plan 
to attack the northern part of Korea and to 
wage a nuclear war." 196! 
At the 396th session of the truce talks, the 
(90) The 1 odong Shinmun, August 1, 1979, p. 5. 
(91) Th.e 1 odong Shinmun, August 10, 1979, p. 5. 
(92) The 1 odong Shinmun, August 11, 1979, p. l, Announces the period from June 27 to July 27 
'the I\ onth of Common Struggle Against America'. 
(93) The 1 odong Shinmu11, August 15, 1979, p.l. 
(94) The 1 odong Shinmun, August 20, 1979, p. 5, p. 6. 
(95) The l1dong Sh.inmun, August 21, 1979, p. 5, p. G. 
(96) The l1dong Shinmur.o, August 26, 1979, p. 2. 
The J, 1dong Shinmun, August 27, 1979, p. 6. 
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North Kor ,an side again strongly criticized the 
U.S. for it> dangerous military provocation. 1~71 
The Roc mg Shinmun carried a lengthy com-
mentary o . January 8, 1980, entitled "The 
triangular military alliance between the U.S., 
Japan and South Korea is very dangerous to 
peace in K )rea and Asia." 1 ~81 The spokesman 
of the Re• olutionary Party of Unification issued 
a statemer t on March Hi in which he strongly 
denounced "the American imperialists and their 
hunting d, gs" for "making a reckless plot to 
bring abO\ t war." 1991 
The Ro rong Shinmun carried a Resolution 
April 19 regarding Korea's unification and 
human rig 1ts in South Korea, adopted at an 
internatiOJ a! conference, stating that ~the 
American ~overnment must withdraw all its 
troops, n clear weapons, and conventional 
weapons f ·om South Korea." 11001 
The Ro, 'ong Shinmun soon thereafter carried 
an editori tl with the theme "Nobody can 
obstruct tl e aspirations of peaceful unification," 
in which 1 ~e Pyongyang authorities pointed out 
that "a : 1rge·scale joint ROK-U.S. military 
exercise c !led Magex SO was a mere means 
through v hich the U.S. tried to maintain its 
colonial r• le over South Korea, and that the 
withdraw! l of American troops from South 
Korea wo tld be a firm step for peace and also 
be good f ·r U.S. intere~.ts."il011 
(97) TJ e Rodong Shinmun, August 27, 1979, p. 6. 
(97) Tl ~ Rodong Shinmun, October 3, 1979, p. 6. 
(98) Ti e Rodong Shinmun, January 8, 1980, p. 2. 
(99) 7'/ e Rodong Shinmun, March 15, 1980, p. 5. 
It 1s noteworthy that starting with 1980's 
The Rodong Shinmun carried reports calling 
for the withdrawal of American troops in South 
Korea from various social organizations abroad 
almost every day. 11021 
On the occasion of the March 1st Independence 
Movement Day of 1980, The Rodong Shinmun 
carried an editorial on the subject of "Let u.s 
open the door for national unification through 
collaboration and unity between North and South 
Korea." In this editorial, the Pyongyang autho-
rities argued that the U.S. should stop its 
intervention in Korea's internal affairs and 
leave South Korea without delay, and that it 
must do nothing harmful to the great work for 
national unification. 11°3> 
At a civilian declaration rally on the 60th 
anniversary of the March 1st Independence 
Movement Day held in Pyongyang, the North 
Korean authorities stressed that "all military 
facilities, including American troops and nuclear 
weapons, be withdrawn from South Korea 
without delay." 11041 
The Rodong Shinmun also mentioned specially 
various communiques issued by many social orga-
nizations abroad opposing the joint ROK-U.S. 
military exercise called Team Spirit '80, and 
scverdy criticized it. 11051 Moreover, through 
The Rodong Shinmun, the spokesman of Revo-
lutionary Party of Unification on March 15 
(100) Tie Rodong Shinmun, April 19, 1980, p. 4; ibid., April 20, 1980, p. 4, p. 6. 
(101) TJ e Rodong Shinmun, April 25, 1980, p. 4. 
(102) Tie Rodong Shinmun, April 30, 1980, p. 4. 
Ti e Rodong Shinmun, May 3, 1980, p. 16. 
(103) T1 e Rodong Shinmun, March 1, 1980, p. L 
(104) lbll., p. 3. 
(105) T e Rodong Shinmun, March 2, 1980, p. 5; ibid., March 7, p. 6; ibid., March 9 p. 6; March 
15 p. 5, p. 6; ibid., March 16, p. 6; ibid., March 21. p. '5; ibid., March 23, p. 6; ibid., 
M ,rch 27, p. 6; ibid., March 28, p .. 6; ibid., March 30, p. 6; ibid., March 31, p. 6; Kang 
K: ong Sao's commentary, ibid., April 4, p. S; ibid. April 5, p. 5, p. 6; ibid., April 12, p. 6; 
ibd., Aprill8, p.6; ibid., April 2~i, p.4; and ibid., May 11, p.6. 
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issued a C< tntnunique declaring that "American 
imperialisn must withdraw its invading weapons, 
and leave iouth Korea."l1°61 
After cer suring American imperialism through 
various cor tmentaries made by overseas social 
organizatic 1s and newspaper, The Rodong 
Shinmun C< rried a comment on April 4 written 
by Kang Y mg·su, a commentator for the organ, 
on the subj 'ct of "an indiscreet tumult peace and 
unification. ' In this piece., he asserted that "the 
Team Spiri : '80 exercise was a reckless action 
to prepare ·or war, and that U.S. continues to 
increase its military power, including a 20% 
increase in its air force." 11071 
It was n JOtted that at the 400th session of 
the truce t; lks, the North Korean side revealed 
and denou teed this "enemy's criminal act", 
which was 1imed at "making a new plot to 
bring about war and to intensify the state of 
tension." <los 
On the m 'moria! day-anniversary of the April 
19, 1960 ~ :udents' Revolution, North Korea 
emphasized hat "the U.S. must stop its reckless 
military act .ons threatening our people, and 
immediately leave South Korea with the removal 
of all invadi tg weapons, and that it at the sarue 
time must f uspend its intervention in Korea's 
internal aff tirs." 11091 Moreover, on the same 
day, The R dong Shinmun carried the resolution 
adopted by .n international conference of peace 
and security held in New Delhi, India, deman-
ding strong! · that "the U.S. must pull out its 
deadly weap ms, troops and nuclear weapons 
without dela r, and that it must comply uncon-
ditionally t< negotiations through which the 
(106) The ~odong Shinmun, March 15, 1980, p. 5. 
(107) The . ~odong Shimnun, April 4, 1980, p. 8. 
(lOS) Ibid., p. 8. 
(109) The . 1odong Shinmun, April 19, 1980, p. 4. 
Armistice Agreement could be transformed into 
a peace agreement." 111o1 
At a Central Reporting Meeting on April 24 
on the occasion of the 48th anniversary of the 
founding of North Korea's peole's Army, the 
Chief of Staff of the People's Army stressed in 
his report that "the Team Spirit '80 operation 
had the purpose of strengthening preparations 
for war: the U.S. must leave South Korea with 
the removal of its all deadly weapons, inclu-
ding nuclear weapons, without delay from 
South Korea." 11!11 
At a joint meeting of government and party 
on June 25, North Korea set forth a plan 
to play a leading role in the forthcoming 
non-aligned conference, and decided to continue 
its energetic fight for the abolition of foreign 
military bases and the withdrawal of 
foreign military troops." 11121 In addition, it 
requested that the members of the non-aligned 
conference should make every effort so that 
foreign troops obstructing national unification 
could be removed from South Korea. On the 
occasion of a month of anti-American struggle 
called for June-July, the Supreme People's Asse-
mbly throughout the world, in which it was 
written: "Korea's unification cannot be achieved, 
and national autonomy cannot be preserved, 
as long as there are foreign military bases and 
foreign troops in South Korea. 
American troops must remove all their military 
facilities, including nuclear weapons, and the 
U.S. must leave the Korean question alone so 
that it can be solved by Koreans themselves." 
11131 
(110) The _ ~odong Shinmun, April 20, 1980, p. 4 (March 23-25 at New Delhi). 
011) The ' ~odong Shinmun, April 25, 1980, p. 4. 
(112) The i laewoe Press (Material series), No. 181, June 25, 1980. 
(113) The ; Taewoe Press (Material series), No. 182, July 2, 1980 (Pyongyang Broadcasting dated 
June 4). 
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The Su1 reme People's Assembly further in-
sisted that "the Armistice Agreement be swit-
ched into a peace agreement, and special 
attention 1 aid to the relations between North 
Korea and the u_s_ as follows: One does not 
encroach 1 pon the other; both sides make efforts 
to elimina e the danger of armed clash; the 
U.S. does not interfere into Korea's internal 
politics; beth sides give U} their military buildup 
and arms race; all foreign military troops 
stationed '1 South Korea under the nam~ of 
U.N. mili 1ry force be removed, and Korea be 
no longer 1llowed to become a military base of 
any foreig 1 state. If such a peace treaty can 
be substit .ted for the present Armistice Agree-
ment, the cause of war will be eliminated, 
and the s 1te of tension will be alleviated. We 
desire tha you put pressure on the U.S. through 
various cl- annels so that it will withdraw its 
military £ •rce from South Korea." 11HI 
North I area's diplomatic and consular offices 
in foreigr countries set the period from June 
25 through July 27, 1980 as "a month for sup-
porting North Korea," and intensively conducted 
campaigns promoting pro-North Korean activities 
and the anti-South Korean struggle- Through 
these campaigns, North Korea claimed that the 
heightened tension in the Korean Peninsula was 
due to the U.S. policy of stationing troops in 
South Korea. On the occasion of the 8th anniver-
sary of the announcement of the July 4th Joint 
South-North Communique, the Rodong Shinmun 
carried an editorial on the subject "Let us press 
forward the great work of national unification 
under the slogan of autonomy, peaceful unifica-
tion and national unity" in which itrepeated 
its previous position that "the U.S- must imme-
diately comply with the proposal of a Joint 
North Korea-U.S. conference, which will deal 
with such problems as the withdrawal of 
American troops and the changing of the 
Armistice Agreement into a peace treaty." '1151 
This was consistent with Korth Korea's pre-
vious position. 
Listing· of Instances of Comment on Americsn Ground Force 
Withdrawal from Korean Peninsula in the Rodong Shinmun 
_Y ~a_r I 1978 19~,-g I Sot rce- .~.-----~ -----------------
-----~-----------------------------------~=~-----·~----: 
Foreign I ress Reports Analysis, Opinions of Foreign Countries 
Orga· izations 
Revolutio wry Unification Party Statements 
Comment .ry 
Secretari< t for Peaceful Unification 
Central ( :Jlnmittee for Peaceful Unification 
Editorial 
A report to a gathering reprinted 
Welcomi1 g party for foreign dignitaries 
Memoria] Day Report 
Central ( ommittee of Korea Federation in Japan 
Military o\rmistice Committee 
Statemen. of North Korea's Social Organizations 
Miscellm eous News Articles 
(114) Ii id. 
(115) 'j he Naewoe Press (Material series), No. 183, July 9, 1980. 
~'he Rodong Sh£nmun, Editorial (July 4, 1980) 
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134 329 
12 
5 
88, 
June, I T 1 1980 ota 
84[ 547 
11 19 
7 50 
12 
9 
2! 18 
I 
5 
3 I 
3 
2 
1 5 
1 9 
13i 147 
------Source ------------------
Statement of J 1inistry of Defense 
Statement of t te Central News Agency 
Total 
Year 
,-------~----- 1978 1 1979 
Instances of Comment by content in the Rodong Shinmun 
June, / T 1 1980 ota 
~-=============================~Y~e~a~r======~, ====~,======c=J~u.=n=e=.~l, ====== 
Conterrt -------------------:..:::.:.__ ~-~~___2:___ 1980 Total 
U.S. forces sh ,uld be immediately withdrawn 
Nuclear weap< rr and all other deadly weapons should be im-
mediately be removed 
ROK-U.S. joir; military exercises should not be allowed, should 
not occur 
ROK-U.S. join; military exercises increase tension and are a 
rash prov< :ation 
Advocate an i: 1mediate withdrawal of American forces from 
South K01 ea 
The forced oc< upation of South,.Korea by American forces is a 
major hin< ranee to the Unification of Korea, and American 
forces sho .ld be withdrawn from Korea 
According to L resolution and commitmen(._of the U.N., 
American ·orces and deadly weapons should be removed 
from Sout L Korea 
Carter should tand by his commitment; to the withdrawal of 
American 'orces from Korea 
American imp< rialists should not interfere in Korea and their 
war polic:~ and their forces and weapons should immediately 
be remove l 
The reinforcer ent or armed forces is justified 
All foreign tr< JPS should be withdrawn 
All U.S. force and their deadly weapons should be withdrawn 
immediate y and completely as this is demanded by the 
people of he world 
American groL 1d forces withdrawal from South Korea only 
hides a re listribution of American military power 
Immediate ren oval of aggressive forces· from;' South Korea 
A peace agree rrent should be sought as the main goal 
American fore s should de withdrawn from South Korea and 
peaceful u Lification should be achieved independently 
Total eradicat Jn of the two Koreas plot should, be pursued 
The U.S. mus· remove their American forces and military equip 
ment from South Korea 
Reject all plot: for the permanent division of Korea 
The removal o ground troops IS a plan in name but not in 
reality for the withdrawal of U.S. military power in Korea 
-50-
33 
33 
24 
15 
13 
11 
4, 
3 
4 
1 
3 
24 
26 
19 
4 
8 
3 
5 
11 
5 
1 
7 
36 
1 
7 
2 
:: 
I 
11 
I 
I 11 
2 
8 
3 
1 
1 
2 
58 
66 
79 
20 
29 
15 
20 
20 
12 
8 
26 
12 
10 
10 
7 
15 
23 
11 
11 
9 
Year 
---c. ntent 
Oppose he permanency of forced occupation of South Korea 
Oppose he intervention of foreign powers 
Dissolve the U.N. Command 
Stand b: commitment to withdrawal of forces and end perma· 
nen1 forced occupation of South Korea 
Behind he scene of a withdrawal of forces is the reinforcement 
of n ilitary might and a plot of war 
America : forces should be withdrawn from south Korea and 
the .hreat of aggressive Japanese reaction eliminated 
America : forces being stationed in South Korea is an. agony 
for ·he South Korean people 
America : imperialism is the real war criminal m Korean 
aggr ,ssion 
Moveme :t to request complete withdrawal of American forces 
shou d be spread 
There is no excuse to prolong American Imperialism in South 
Kore L 
Federati< n system for North·South Korea is most reasonable 
met!: )d of unification 
To deere tse tension, the unconditional withdrawal of American 
force ; is necessary 
America! Imperialism ~;hould keep its hands off Korea 
Foreign nilitary bases should be abolished 
Foreign · Grces of aggression should be removed 
A halt s: auld be put to the preparation of nuclear war by 
Arne ican forces in Korea 
There is a new plan for preparation of war on the peninsula 
Hands of Korea totally 
American aggressor should be driven from Korea 
U.S. she 1ld have contacts with North Korea for peaceful 
resol· tion 
U.S. &hOL ld retract its two Koreas policy and American forces 
and ggressive weapons must be driven out completely from 
Soud Korea 
American Imperialism should keep its hands off the provocation 
of w. r 
Aggressi\ o forces in South Korea should be withdrawn 
Aggressiv o ambitions of American imperialism should be 
imme liately discontinued 
South Ko ean people are fighting against American imperialism 
and i s puppets' suppression 
American forces should be driven out from South Korea and a 
halt . ut to its support for South Korea's regime 
American imperialism is a threat to peace in Korea and pro· 
vocat ve military action should be halted 
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78 
4 
3 
4 
2 
4 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
4 
1 
1 
1 
7 
1 
1 
1 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
79 
71 
! 
I 
21 
I 
11 
8: 
7 
5 
2 
11 
6 
June, 
1980 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
3 
2 
11 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Total 
11 
5 
4 
4 
6 
10 
1 
1 
4 
1 
1 
9 
8 
7 
3 
16 
8 
9 
4 
3 
10 
8 
5 
9 
3 
8 
6 
----------Canter t 
All military :listurbances should be halted 
78 Year j 
·-·----------1 
1 
79 June, IT 1 1980 ! ota 
4\ 1 6 
Korean peop] ! do not condone American imperialism and South 1 4[ 6 
Korea's hread of power I 
The withdra <al of U.S. ground forces is an excuse for increa-
sed supp ession by South Korea's puppet regime 11 
2 4 
III. Re ;ponse of South Korea 
l_ Gov ~rnment 
U.S. Presic "nt Jimmy Carter announced on 
April 21, 197 i that two combat battalions sched-
uled to be '·ithdrawn fro::n South Korea in 
1978 would remain in that country. Carter 
issued a stat ~ment saying just one battalion 
would be wi :hdrawn in 1978 instead of the 
three original y planned. Ill 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Park Tong-jin 
said that "Ca ·ter' s rethinking of the pullout is 
a realistic j1 dgment but future withdrawals 
of U.S. troop must be accompanied by compen-
sation measUI "s," 1'' Park Tong-jin emphasized 
that "the An erican forces stationed in Korea 
are a deterrei t power on the Korean peninsula, 
therefore, the withdrawal of American forces 
should be apr :oached more cautiously and with 
flexibility, gi' ing compensation higher priority." 
(3) 
Kim Kyun! -won, special assistant for inter-
national affai s to Korea's late President Park 
Chung-hee. tc d Newsweek magazine that some 
Koreans are b• ginning to question U.S. strength. 
He said in th interview that in the past "there 
was the assu nption the U.S. had both the 
physical stren :th and political will to be an 
active participant in the regional equilibrium in 
Northeast Asia. Some people are beginning to 
question this. The Korean public reacted to the 
decision to withdraw troops from South Korea 
with a great deal of puzzlement." 1 ~ 1 
Korean Ambassador to the U.S. Mr. Kim 
Yong-shik said that "the North Koreans have 
been taking a negative attitude toward our 
three-stage program for unification and further-
more, they have simply repeated their demands 
for the unconditional withdrawal of U.S. forces 
from the Korean peninsula along with a green 
light for communist political activity in the 
South." Kim said that "militarily, ~orth Korea 
is far superior to the South, in naval and 
airpower as well as fire power of ground troops, 
but the presence of American troops over the 
past 25 years has deterred aggression from the 
North. Economically, South Korea is far superior 
to North Korea. Howev~r, that the present U.S. 
administration plans to withdraw American 
troops may encourage the North Koreans to 
believe that the international situation IS 
turning in their favor." 
Minister of Defense Ro Jae-hyun discussed 
with his U.S. counterpart, Harold Brown, 
matters regarding the security of Korea. They 
discussed the Korean armed forces improvement 
program and American support ot Korea's 
(1) The .A 1rea Herald, April 23, 1978 (Washington-AP) Each battalion has about 800 persons. 
(2) The £ mg-A Ilbo, April 25, 1978. 
(3) Ibid. 
(4) The K1rea Times, August 5, 1978. (New York-UP!) 
(5) The F. 1rea Herald, October 7, 1978. (Washington-Hapdong) In his speech to the Rotary 
Club i . Cleveland Ohio. The Korea Times, October 7, 1978. (Cleveland-UP!) 
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.defense inc ustry. 161 The ROK-U.S. Combined 
Forces Con mand was established on November 
7, 1978. 171 
A grou] of 219 soldiers of the Second 
Battalion, Ninth Company of the Second 
Infantry [ ,vision, left for the United States 
aboard a c 1artered airplane on December 13, 
1978, to 1: ;come the first U.S. ground combat 
trcops to I e withdrawn from Korea. lSI 
The Mi: istry of Defense of Korea had a 
special me1 ting of the commanders of the Korean 
Army to t iscuss the American ground troops 
withuraw: l plan and general situation of Nor· 
theast Asi L. ' 01 
A ne'N Jnited States Army intelligence report 
has conch clcd that the strength of the North 
Korean A my is far greater than previously 
estimated. The finding has aroused controversy 
over both the adequacy of existing intelligence 
estima~es and President Carter's decisior1 to 
witht!raw American ground combat troops [rom 
South K0 ea. It indicated the communist nation 
had the e Juivalent of 41 divisions rather than 
the 28 •reviously estimated by the Carter 
Administ1 1tion, and a force of some 2, 000 
tanks, at .east 300 more than had been listed 
previoc1sl; by American intelligence. 1101 
Korean authorities said on January 8, 1979 
that "the1 c is reason to ::eview the ground troop 
pullout ir light of a report that North Korean 
military 1 ower is greatEr than had been esti· 
mated pr viously." 1111 
7 ~e Kor<a Herald, November 7, 1978. 
7 ~e Dong-A llbo, November 7, 1978. 
President Park Chung·hee said that "we 
desire to keep American ground forces in Korea, 
but given the decision of the American admi· 
stration and the fact that we need to avoid 
any military conflict on the Korean peninsula 
and keep the military balance, we request the 
strengthening of other military sectors in com· 
pensation." 1121 President Park Chung·hee empha· 
sized that the American troop pullout from the 
Korean peninsula was a problem, and stressed 
more cooperation between the two countries. 1131 
It became clear that Korea and the United 
States should start negotiations on the revision 
of the U.S. troop withdrawal plan if that was 
necessary for the maintenance of peace on the 
Korean peninsula, and that is precisely what 
Ambassador to the U.S. Kim Yong-shik said on 
January 17, 1979, after returning to Washington 
after winding up home consultations. 1141 
President Park Chung-hee proposed to Korth 
Korea on January 19, 1979 to resume uncondi· 
tionally the South-North dialogue at any level, 
at any time and in any place to discuss directly 
and frankly all unification-related problems. 1151 
Alluding to a self-reliant defense posture folio· 
wing following possible U.S. ground troops 
withdrawal, President Park disclosed that "the 
nation was fully prepared to meet any challenges, 
pursuing steadily programs to develop guided 
missiles, manufacture highly sophisticated 
electronic armaments and airplanes as well in 
(6;, 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
7 lw Korea Herald, December 14, 1978. The Hankook Ilbo, December 14, 1978. 
'1 ~e Choong Ang Ilbo, December 15, 1978. 
(10) 
(ll) 
(12) 
(13) 
'1 ~e New York Times, January 4, 1979. 
'1 he Dong· A llbo, January 8, 1979. 
'1 he Choong Ang llbo, November 21, 1978. The Dong· A Ilbo, November 21, 1978. President 
P trk Chung·hee had a discussion with a group of American congressmen at Chong Wa Dae 
o . December 20, 1978. 
~'he Dong-A Ilbo, January 13, 1979. President Park spoke with Sen. Sam Nunn, Chairman 
o the Manpower and Personnel Subcommittee of the Armed Service Committee of the U.S. 
S mate. 
(14) :'he Korea Herald, January 18, 1979. 
(15) :'he Korea Times, January 20, 1979. New Year press meeting. 
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the middle 1 art of the 1980's." 1161 
South Kor a accepted a North Korean proposal 
to hold pn liminary discussions on unifying 
the divided country, creating the framework 
for the first talks between the divided halves 
in seven ye~ :s on January 26, 1979. 1181 
South KOJ ~an officials appeared somewhat 
disappointed that the visit to Washington and 
Tokyo by De >Uty Prime Minister Teng Hsia-ping 
of China did not have the side effect of gener-
ating momer: :urn to restart political talks on tl:e 
Korean peni1 sula. Because North Korea under 
Kim Il-sung had maneuvered successfully in 
the Soviet-C: inese rivalry, China found it too 
risky at the time to press North Korea into 
accepting aJ accommodation with the Seoul 
regime. 
"It will ta ~e time before China could expect 
to influence north Korea in any significant 
degree," sai . Representative Park Jun-kyu, a 
senior policy aaker for President Park. n91 
President I ark Chung-hee on March l, 1979 
once again :alled for the unconditional and 
immediate r ~opening of dialogue between 
pertinent aut tOrities of South Korea and North 
Korea as the best way to realize the peaceful 
reunification of the Korean peninsula. 1201 
South Kon 1 demanded that North Korea pro-
mptly respon l to its call for the resumption of 
South-North lialogue by sending a competent 
delegation to the conference table on April 7, 
(16) Ibid. ihe Korea Herald, January 21, 1980. 
1979, m a statement by Rhee Kyung-sik, 
spokesman of Seoul's working-level delegation 
for the South-North dialogue. 121 1 
South Korea Minister of Foreign Affairs Park 
Tong-jin said "there is no need for a three-
party meeting on Korean problems Direct talks 
between the South and North should solve the 
Korean issues." 1221 
President Park Chung-hee expressed the view 
that "the revising of the American ground 
troops withdrawal plan by the U.S. administ-
ration is very welcome. The Korean question 
should be discussed by South and North Korea 
themselves." 1231 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Park Tong-Jin 
noted that the U.S. administration would find 
it inevitable to rewrite its plan for troop with-
drawal from Korea. 1241 Prime Minister Choi 
Kyu-hah said on June 21, 1979 the U.S. decision 
to freeze its ground troop withdrawals from 
South Korea until 1981 was "a firm manifes-
tation of its commitment to the Republic of 
Korea." 1251 
U.S. President Jimmy Carter's announcement 
on July 21, 1979 of the suspension of the U.S. 
ground troops withdrawal from Korea should 
be interpreted as an "indefinite" freeze or a 
"virtual nullification" of the original plan, a 
senior official at the Ministry of Foreign Affai~s 
said on July 21, 1979. 1261 
Both political parties of South Korea wel· 
(17) The · Vashington Post, January 27, 1979, p.A 1. 
(18) The j :orea Times, January 27, 1979. 
(19) The ; Tew York Times, February 11, 1979, p. 20. 
(20) The , :orea Herald, March 1. 1979. 
(21) The j :orea Herald, April 8, 1979. 
(22) The j [ankook llbo, May 12, 1979. The Chosun Ilbo, May 12, 1979. 
(23) The , :yung Hyang Shinmun, May 12, 1979. President Park discussed the American ground 
troops withdrawal with former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger at Chong Wa Dae on 
May 2, 1979. 
(24) The i :orea Herald, June 28, 1979. 
(25) The l :orea Herald, June 22, 1979. 
(26) The 1 :orea Herald, .July 22, 1979. 
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corned U.~ President Carter's decision to freeze 
the withdr 1wal of American ground troops from 
Korea. Re '· Oh You-bang, spokesman of the 
Democrati< Republican Party(DRP), commented 
that Carte 's decision was an ideal one based 
on the rea ;sessmcnt of the latest power balance 
on the K Jrean peninsula. Similar comments 
came frorr Rep. Jung Je-ho, spokesman of the 
Yujong-ho '· He said the freezing of the with-
drawal of American forces from Korea was 
quite an < Jpropriate decision for the mainten-
ance of pt ace on the Korean peninsula and in 
Northeast Asia overall. Meanwhile, Rep. Park 
Kwon-heo o., spokesman of New Democratic 
Party, we corned the decision, saying that it 
would cor tribute to promoting peace and secu-
rity in K< rea and Asia. 12n 
North I .orea formally rejected, on July 10, 
1979, a :hree-party talks proposal by South 
Korea. A< cording to Naewoe News Agency North 
Korea rei erated its previous demand for direct 
talks wit! the United States, alleging that South 
Korea wa; not qualified to participate in any 
discussion; of U.S. troops withdrawal or con-
clusion ol a peace treaty but only in discussions 
of Koreat unification, as it is not a signatory 
of the ar. 1istice agreement. 1281 
Such a reaction by North Korea reflects no 
change it its previous stand and makes it clear 
once agai 1 that it has no intention to respond 
to the ca I for constructive dialogue between 
the divid ,d halves. 
The M nistry of Foreign Affairs of South 
Korea E ~pressed regr•2t over Pyongyang's 
negative reaction to the ROK-U.S. joint proposal 
for the convening of a meeting of official 
(27) [, id. 
representatives of South and North Korea and 
the United States and urged Pyongyang to 
respond positively to the peace initiative. 1291 
The South Korean government has decided to 
raise annual military spending in 1980 by 
about $500 million, equivalent to I percent 
of the nation's gross national product, from 
currently budgeted levels, the New York 
Times reported on July 10, 1979. 1301 According 
to the New York Times, Carter, it appears, 
used the reversal of his position on withdrawal 
of U.S. ground troops from Korea to put preosure 
on the Korean government to increase military 
spending. 
South Korean President Park Chung-hee on 
August 15, 1979 renewed a call for three-
way talks on the Korean question among the 
two Koreas and the United States, but accused 
North Korea of continuing "a reckless military 
buildup" to take the South by force. 131l 
Foreign Minister Park Tong-jin has denoun-
ced, as a tactic to propagandize itself abroad 
as the sole government on the Korea peninsula 
and to degrade the status of Seoul in interna-
tional society, that Pyongyang tries to have 
bilateral talks and conclude a peace agreement 
with the United States.l32 ' 
U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine 
units joined with their Korean counterparts for 
joint combined maneuvers in Exercise Team 
Spirit '80 beginning on March l, 1980. 1331 
Kim Young-sam, President of the New Demo-
cratic Party, said on February 27, 1980 that 
the stationing of U.S. forces in Korea had 
greatly contributed not only to easing tension 
on the Korean peninsula, but also to maintaining 
(28) 7 he Korea Herald, July 11, 1979. The Korea Times, July 18, 1979. 
(29) ~'he Korea Herald, July 11, 1979. 
(30) ~'he Korea Times, August 11, 1979. The New York Times, August 10, 1979. 
(31) :'he Washingto11 Post, August 16, 1979, p. A. 24. 
(32) : 'he Korea Times, September 9, 1979. 
(33) :'he Korea Times, March 2, 1980. 
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peace in East Asia. 1341 
South Kore< n Defense Minister Choo Young-
bock urged N ,rth Korea on March 2, 1980 to 
stop immediat ~ly any provocations if it truly 
wanted to rna ntain security and peace on the 
Korean penim 1la. He pointed out that North 
Korea launch<:! an all-out surprise attack on 
the South in 950 after it suggested talks for 
peace negoti tions between the South and 
the North. T 1e minister warned any further 
savage action~ committed by the North would 
be chastised i t a very determined way. 1351 
2. Non Government 
The recent tction of the C.S. House Subcom-
mittee causec one vmce after another to be 
raised by an increasing number of political 
analysts and military strategists on the new 
direction tow .rd which American foreign and 
defense policy vis-a-vis Northeast Asia should 
be reoriented. "At this juncture, it is significant 
that the u.S. government is known to have 
taken up the t :oop withdrawal issue for review 
and possible 1 cvision. It is reassuring that our 
long-standing md well verified contention that 
the U.S. milit try presence on a sizeable level 
is essential to the peace and security of Korea 
has found a louder echo in ·washington. A 
serious recons Jeration of this point is definitely 
in order now. ' 1361 
The New 0, mocratic Party issued a statement 
on May 1, 1! 78 that "maintaining American 
ground troops n Korea is essential as a deterrent 
to war in Ko~ 2a" and "consultations with the 
Korean goverr ment on Korean security problems 
-should prece< e any actual American policy 
<:hanges. 1371 
"The U.S. · rould like to think that if the 
(34) The K )rea Times, February 28, 1980. 
(35) The R Jrea Times, March 3, 1980. 
U.S. ground forces were withdrawn from the 
Korean peninsula, then the U.S. could avoid 
direct intervention in a conflict on the Korean 
peninsula and still deter an invasion by the 
supporting presence of a1r force and naval 
power. The U.S. global strategy which thus 
chooses to resolve its part in the Korean ques· 
tion may have too much of the confident arro-
gance of the great power-the U.S. may suddenly 
find itself under a dangerous illusion. 1381 A lea-
ding Korean scholar in international relations 
observed that U.S. President Jimmy Carter's 
policy on the withdrawal of the American 
ground troops from Korea "itself" would not be 
changed, but there might be some changes 
in the course of its implementation. Dr. Han 
Sung-joo of Korea University, at a seminar 
on the "The Carter Troop Withdrawal Deci-
sion, Policy Formation and Implementation", 
recalled that "President Carter's troop with-
drawal decision was not made under norma! 
circumstances in the United States in view of 
domestic and international situations it then 
faced, including the American debacle m 
Vietnam in 1975. 
However, those who oppose the troop pullout 
policy have reasonable logic, Han said. Their 
logic is that "there is a gap in military power 
between South and North Korea. If the American 
troops are withdrawn from the peninsula, North 
Korea would be tempted to make a southward 
invasion. South and North Korea would be 
involved in heated competition in building up 
military power. South Korea might develop 
nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the projected 
troop pullout will have an ad verse effect on 
the economic development of the Republic of 
Korea. The troops withdrawal result in the 
(36) The R Jrea Herald, editorial: "Pullout Review in Order," April 11, 19/8. 
(37) The L mg-A Ilbo, May l, 1978. 
(38) Ree S< ag-woo, "Will the U.S. withdww from Asia?", The Hankook Ilbo, May 10, 1978. 
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decrease Jf foreign capital investments in South 
Korea. ~'he troops withdrawal might lessen 
the U.S. influence in Korea."<391 
The l :orea-Japan Parliamentary Security 
Consulta ive Counil was formally inaugurated 
in Seoul •n April 30, 1978 with the opening of 
its first ~eneral conference at the Plaza Hotel 
in Seoul attended by legislators of the two 
countries Rep. Lee Chong-chan, former Korean 
defense 1 tinister who heads the Korean team, 
said in a keynote address that tension on the 
Korean p minsula was increasingly sharpened, 
taking a new tone amid growing Soviet military 
pressure in the Far East and continuing 
conflicts in Indochina. In another keynote 
speech, J tpanese chief delegate Y.ichita Sakata 
said "it i ; desirable that America suspend the 
military •ullout for time being to maintain the 
status qu 1 on the Korean peninsula." <401 
The mi itary leaders and other politicallead2rs 
familiar ivith the Northeast Asian situation 
strongly •pposed any such move as withdrawing 
American ground forces from Korea. \Vhat 
they fav 1red in Korea was a stronger and 
firmer U S. commitment, and modernization of 
the U.S. and Korean ground forces-not to 
attack bu to maintain peace in the region."<411 
Both n ling and opposition parties \Velcomed 
on July ~ 2, 1979, in respective statements, the 
U.S. deci ;ion to freeze its troop withdrawals 
from Km "a until 1981. Rep. Oh You-bang, 
spokesma t for the ruling Democratic Republican 
Party, ha led it as "realistic and rer.sona hie." 
He, addec that the pullout freeze would greatly 
contribut• to promoting security and peace in 
Northeas: Asia and the Pacific region. 
(39) 7 1e Korea Herald, November 8, 1978. 
(40) 7 !e Korea Herald, May l, 1980. 
Yujong-hoe spokesman Rep_ Jung Je-ho said 
that the decision stood for binational cooperation 
based on "mature relations between the two 
countries." Rep. Park Kwon-hum, spokesman of 
the opposition New Democratic Party, said the 
party reaffirmed the necessity of U.S. military 
presence in South Korea for national security 
and prevention of war on the peninsula. 1''1 
The Republic of Korea and the United States 
have renewed their common pledge to defend 
the Korean peninsula from aggressive force on 
the occasion of the renaming of the existing 
Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command. Accor-
ding to a Korea Times editorial on the Com-
bined Field Army, "we attach particular ~igni­
ficance to this impressive occrrsion, timely with 
the ongoing Team Spirit '80 war games, which 
is considered an unprecedented combat exercise 
undertaken by South Korean and U.S. militay 
strategists. The redesignation of the Korea-U.S. 
Combined Forces Setup should mean much in 
this context, showing U.S. determir.at;on to 
ccntinu2 its military prese::1ce on the Korean 
peninsula until such a time as it confirws a 
drastic change in the !\'orth Korea policy toward 
the South discarding its revolutionary plot 
against the Republic. We make a due estimate 
of the positive U.S. military presence here, 
particularly in transition stage directed toward 
social and political reforms is South Korea these 
days. It is also our firm conviction that the 
latest U.S. military d£cision in Korea \viii un-
doubtedly encourage our sustained eiforts 
for attaining a self-supporting defense in the 
forseeable future." 1431 
(41) R e Chong-ik, "Carter's visit to Korea", The Korea Times, July l, 19/9. 
(42) 7 ze Korea Times, July 22, 1979. 
(43) 7 ze Korea Times, March 13, 1980. 
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Response of South Korea: Government 
Type of Remarks Frequency of Remarks 
~~t -----------==~1 78 
President Par .. Chung-hee on the problems of the plan of troops 1 
withdraw J from South Korea and emphasis on a close 
cooperatic a system between ROK-U.S. 
Park Chung-b ~e on unconditional reopening of North-South talks 
President Chc i Kyu-ha on above. 
Prime Minist< r Shin Hyon-hwak on above. 
Minister of F >reign Affairs Park Tong-jin on the amendment 
of the ph n to American troops as realistic and requiring 
a recomp< nsation plan 
Korean Amba sador to the U.S. Kim Yong-sik on concern about 1 
the Amer can forces withdrawal from South Korea 
Minister of I efense Rho Jae-hyun on recompensation upon 
withdraw I of forces and efforts for improvement of defense 
industry 
Special Assist< nt to the President Kim Kyong-won on the Korean 
people's mxiety on American forces withdrawal from 
South Ko ea 
Ministry of I: ~fense special meeting of military leaders: concern 
over with lrawal plan 
Minister of U 1ification: concern over withdrawal plan 
Representativ• of Seoul side for North-South working-level 
talks Toni Hoon on concern over the withdrawal plan 
Increase of te 1sion over venue of North-South talks 
Disagreement )n important issues at North-South Korea talks 
Reopen hot·li1 e between Pyongyang and Seoul 
Possibility of :eadjustment of withdrawal of American forces 
plan 
2 
2, 
-
-
-
-
Team Spirit ',Q' ROK-U.S. military maneuvers -
Acting chain .an North-South coordinating committee Seo u -
represent< tive Min Kwan Shik 
79 
17 
2 
14 
4 
2 
2 
1 
1 
2 
4 
80 Total 
- 18 
- 2 
5 7 
14 1-! 
61 
21 
I 
_, 6 
I 3 -r 
'r 
4 
I 
I 3 -~ 
I 
11 2 
-I 2 
I 
2: 2 
J 5 o, 
3' 3 
-1 4 I 
I 
Si 
-I 5 
I 
I 
---------------------------------------------~-----------
Non-Government Organization 
American fore ~s stationed m Korea are an essential element 1 
for stabili .y and peace 
Carter's Amer :an force's withdrawal plan should be reconsidered: 
Article by I rofessor 
New Democ ·atic Party 
There is no p ogress in the North-South talks at Panmunjom 
Meeting bet" een President Park Chung-hee and Carter to 
discuss fn ezing of American force withdrawal plan 
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2 
1 
4 
2 
1 
2 
--;; :ent ~~--J 78 79 80 Total 
New De nocratic Party and Republican Democratic Party 
wele< me the postponement of the American troops withd-
rawa plan 
1 1 
Editorial 
Team Spi ·it '80' 
Increase i 1 U.S., Japan and Chir.ese military cooperation 
Concern J )r a possible North Korean "misjudgment" because 
z 
1 
1 
1 
of th· troop withdrawal plan 
--- -------------------------------------·------ ----
IV. Conclusion 
By Ma) of 1975 candidate Carter had pledged 
to withd1 1w all U.S. ground combat troops 
from Kon a within fiveyears if he became Presi-
dent. The option in Policy Review Memorandum 
on Korea! PRM 13) were designed primarily to 
implemen· a decision already announced by the 
President m March 9, 1977. The estimate in 
PRM 13 i 1dicating that North Korea has an 
important firepower advantage over South 
Korea al< ne was discounted because of the 
continuin1 U.S. air, naval and ground support 
role after l981. <ll 
South I< orean officials believe that they were 
not consu ted but were only "informed." Bet-
ween Mal ~h and July 1977 they knew only that 
U.S. trooJ s would be leaving, but they were 
uncertain 1bout timing and compensation. As a 
result, gnat anxiety existed in South Korea. 
The July 1977 Security Consultative Meeting 
in Seoul 1 rovided the :first consultations and 
firm U.S. promises regarding compensation, and 
as a res1 lt reduced the concerns of South 
Korean of 'icials. <Zl 
Preside! t Park Chung .. hee pointed out that 
the plan for withdrawal of troops was proble-
matic and emphasized a system of closer 
cooperation between the Republic of Korea and 
the U.S. for Korean security. He empha-
sized these paints 18 times from 1978 to 1980 .. 
Prime Minister Shin Hyon-hwak also pointed 
them out 14 times in 1980. Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Park Tong-jin emphasized that amend-
ment of the plan to withdraw of American 
troops was realistic and be followed by a com-
pensation plan more than 24 times from 1978 to 
June 1980. Special assistant to President Pak 
Chung-hee, Kim Kyong-won pointed out 4 times 
from 1978-1979 that the American troops with-
drawal issue had caused the Korean people great 
anxiety. This will give some idea of the South 
Korean government's position on the troop 
withdrawal issue. The American troop with-
drawal policy was firm. Therefore, South 
Korean officials were in favor of military com-
pensation in other respect and modernization of 
the Korean army. 
The response of non-government organizations 
in Korea indicated that they thought American 
forces stationed in Korea were an essential 
element for stability and peace on the Korean 
peninsula. Most Korean people remember that 
American troops were withdrawn in 1949 and 
there followed the North Korean aggression 
(1) U. 'l .. Troop Withdrawal From the Republic of Korea: A report to the Committee on Foreign 
RE .ations, United States Senate by Senators Hubert H. Humphrey and John Glenn, January 
9, 1978. (95th Congress 2nd Session), U.S. Goverment Printing Office, Washington, 1978, 
pp 1-2. 
(2) Ibi l., p. 2. 
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which starte• the Korean war in June 1950. 
Therefore, the Korean people are anxious to 
see an arne 1dment of the troop withdrawal 
plan by the 1\merican gov<~rnment. After Presi-
dent Carter •isited Korea in July 1979, a U.S. 
governmEnt ;tatement on the post{:onemerrt of 
the Americm troop withdrawal plan was wel-
comed by go rernmerrt officials and citizens. The 
joint militar exercise of ROK-U.S. combimd 
forces encom >ged the Korean people with regard 
to the securi y and stability of their fatherland. 
A U.S. . 1ilitary presence has also b2en 
necessary be ause of the 1953 Armistice Agree-
ment. Since .he United States signed the armi-
stice rather han South Korea, the United States 
is respon~;ibl under the agreement for truce 
keeping. Te :hnically, a state of war continues 
interrupted Jy an armistice now in its 27th 
year. Both t te United States and the Republic 
of Korea ha· e repeatedly called for a mere· 
permanent a ·rangement, but all such attempts 
have been rejected by the North. '31 When 
Presider,t c~ ·ter visited South Korea in July 
1979 and ·roposed three-way talks to the 
North, this : roposal was also rejected by the 
North. 141 
However, "yongyang's ,.tatement that time 
rejected a I teeting among Seoul, Pyongyang 
and Washii gton. In the statement, North 
Korea called for two-way talks between the 
United Stat >s and North Korea, aim2d at 
discussing 11atters related to the w·ithdrawal 
of American forces from Korea and the con-
clusion of a peace agreement, totally separate 
from North South Korean talks aimed at 
discussing tl e Korean unification problem. 
Pyongyan1 alleged that the holding of a 
·washington· "yongyang meeting is quite natural 
m view of he fact that the two are the direct 
(3) Ibid .. p. 3. 
( 4) The Korea Times, July 4, 1979. 
(5) The Korea Herald, July 11, 1979. 
parties concerned with the signing of the Korea 
Armistice Agreement. 
It further alleged that "there are no legal 
and logical grounds for South Korea to inter-
vene in" the U.S. -North Korea meeting. 151 
North Korea has never wavered in its stance 
that the U.S. military presence in South Korea 
should be totally and unconditionally removed. 
Its denunciation of the oppressive imperialist 
occupiers in the South does not seem to haYe 
changed at all from that \Yhich was heard 
prior to the U.S. withdrawal in 19-49. 
Because of the importance of stability m 
Korea, the United States shares with China, 
Japan and the Soviet Union an interest in easing 
tension on the peninsula. President Carter's 
decison to withdraw U.S. ground troops from 
Korea has naturally caused other Asian states 
to reconsider the role of the United States in 
East Asia. Korean developments thus are a 
key to stability in the region. 161 
V. Summary 
1. The North Korean Reaction 
One of North Korea's main foreign policy 
contentions is that all U.S. troops must be 
withdrawn from the peninsula. However they 
were very much skeptical from the beginning 
of Carter's plan to pull the U.S. troops out of 
South Korea. North Korea11. intelligence moni· 
tored what was claimed to be an increase m 
air power by the U.S. on the peninsula m 
January, 1978 and reacted critically to the esta-
blishment of the ROK-U.S. Joint Command the 
same year. North Korea concluded that U.S. 
claims of a troop reduction and eventual with-
drawal amounted to a smokescreen tactic behind 
(6) U.S. Troop Withdrawal From the Republic of Korea, op. cit., p. 9 
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which wou .d occur a massive buildup in mili-
tary sector other than ground troops, for the 
purposes o· perpetuating the division of the 
peninsula a 1d preparing an aggressive war effort. 
A relent] $S drive calling for the total removal 
of "U.S. i11perialist aggressors and their wea-
pons of de .truction" coincided with the period 
of controv rsy in South Korea and the U.S. 
over the projected troop withdrawal plan. 
Statements from nations sympathetic to North 
Korea wer ~ carried in the Rodong Shinmun. 
Chinese Premier Hua Kuo-feng, Rumanian 
President 1/icolae Ceausescu, Japanese Socialist 
Party mer .her Itzio Askada and Congo President 
Opango al made state visits in May 1978 to 
deplore th ~ U.S. perpetuation of the division 
of the per insula and to support the complete 
withdraw: l of U.S. forces. 
Accardi: g to statements in the Party organ 
the Rodon, · Shinmun the decision to freeze the 
troop wit! drawal was seen by the North Korean 
authoritie~ as a continuation of U.S. interven· 
tion in Iouth Korean affairs, from military 
support 1 ) support of a suppressive puppet 
regime. 
Upon l S. President Carter's 1979 visit to 
South K• rea, Pyongyang said through the 
Rodong Si inmun that they believed Carter never 
had any : 1tention to withdraw troops. 
A comn ent in the Rodong Shinmun in August, 
1979, sai• the U.S. withdrawal plan reversal 
had resu ted in strengthening South Korea, 
instigated Japan to build military links with 
South Ko ea and had been aimed at a triangular 
military : lliance between the U.S., Japan and 
South Ko ·ea. 
North : ~area has maintained vehemently into 
1980 that the U.S. presence should be removed 
altogethe: from the peninsula following the 
transform ltion of the Armistice Agreement into 
a peace t ·eaty, and that North and South Korea 
alone she 1ld pursue unification. 
2. The South Korean Reaction 
The initial South Korean reaction to President 
Carter's proposed troop withdrawal plan was 
an objection to the fact that it had been a 
unilateral decision. Officials felt they should 
have been consulted. Cooperation on the matter 
has been stressed. 
There is the desire for military self-sufficiency 
in South Korea, so compensation in other 
military sectors for the projected reduced 
ground forces was a major concern. Yet, as 
evidenced by a Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
statement on July 21, 1979, to the effect that 
the suspension of the withdrawal plan could 
be regarded as a virtual nullification of it, the 
South Korean government felt the realistic 
approach would be to keep things as they were 
for the time being. 
That the presence of the troops themselves 
was repeatedly cited as the single major deter-
rent to war on the peninsula shows concern 
that the balance of power was such that it 
could not be easily tampered with. 
U.S. intelligence reassessed the balance of 
power on the peninsula in July, 1979, and 
determined President Carter's plan to be unti-
mely. As Dr. Han Sung·joo has observed, the 
decision to withdraw troops had been taken by 
Carter under the influence of public sentiment 
after the Vietnam debacle, during an election 
campaign. 
The projected troop withdrawal had caused 
great anxiety in South Korea. The process of 
revising and eventually freezing the removal 
of ground forces was very much favorable 
to south Korea. 
The South Korean government raised annual 
military spending in 1980 by $ 500 million, 
according to the New York Times. This and 
efforts, notably by President Park Chung-hee, 
in 1979 to have constructive, tension-relieving 
talks with North Korea followed the U.S. admi-
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nistration' s ·eversal on the troop withdrawal 
issue. Rulin ~ and opposition party alike wel· 
.corned on ]1 ly 22, 1979, the U.S. decision to 
.freeze the v ithdrawal until 1981. 
The U.S. sesture of concern and attention in 
redesignatin, · the ROK·U..S. combined forces 
command as the Combined Field Army in 1980 
was met w th wide approval. The massive 
Team Spirit '80 combined maneuvers further 
elicited resp• nses that the U.S. was showing 
an ever-stroi g commitment to security on the 
peninsula. 
Indications were that elements not only in South 
Korea but in Japan and other Asian countries 
began to question U.S. military strength and 
political will when the troop withdrawal plan 
was in effect from 1977 to 1979. The view 
from South Korea is that the communists in 
the North remain the unrepentant aggressors 
they were in 1950, when they invaded the 
South after the withdrawal of American troops 
in 1949. An active U.S. role in maintaining 
the equilibrium in the Northeast Asian region 
is still very much necessary. 
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